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Abstract
Many studies have found a gap between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept that
is inconsistent with standard theory. There is also evidence that the gap is eroded by experi-
ence gained in the laboratory and naturally occurring markets. This paper argues that the gap
and the effects of experience are explained by a caution heuristic. This conjecture is tested in
a repeated market experiment with symmetric and asymmetric information. The results sup-
port the conjecture: people do seem to use heuristics rather than reacting optimally and their
behavior adjusts slowly when the environment changes.
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Over the last thirty years, a large body of evidence has accumulated that suggests willingness
to accept (WTA) valuations exceed willingness to pay (WTP) valuations.1 This gap between WTA
and WTP is an anomaly for standard theory.2 A consequence of the gap is that people are less
willing to trade than standard theory predicts, so gains from trade may not be fully realized. A
natural question that has been the focus of some recent research is whether the incentives and
experience provided by markets eliminate the gap. A number of studies (see Table 1) have found
that when items are bought or sold repeatedly in laboratory markets, the WTA/WTP gap decays.
Additionally, recent studies using subjects recruited at sportscard and memorabilia markets (List,
2003, 2004) have found that those with relatively less intense trading experience exhibit the gap
while those with relatively more intense trading experience do not. Together, these studies show
(a) that market experience acquired in the lab and (b) that certain market experience acquired in
naturally occurring markets can be sufficient to eliminate the gap. What is puzzling, however, is
why we observe a gap at all: if experience outside the lab has the potential to eliminate the gap,
why does the gap survive until a subject enters the lab, then decay within a few minutes? Given
that subjects with intense trading experience tend not to exhibit the gap but are no more familiar
with the experimental procedures than typical subjects, misconceptions about the nature of the
experimental tasks (as argued by Plott and Zeiler (2005)) cannot easily explain the results.
This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle and presents an experiment to test it. The conjec-
ture is that observed WTA/WTP gaps are the result of people using a caution heuristic that causes
them to make costly errors in the lab but protects them from costly errors in naturally occurring
settings.3 The explanation is based on the following principles.
1. People solve some decision problems using heuristics rather than deliberate analysis.4
2. People use heuristics that tend to produce good outcomes in the environment they inhabit.
3. Most people face asymmetric information as the uninformed party in naturally occurring
markets, so a heuristic that tends to produce good outcomes is setting WTA above WTP.
On this view, a typical subject in a laboratory experiment has experience of trading under asym-
metric information as the uninformed party. In valuation tasks, she initially sets WTA above WTP.
This causes her to make costly errors, so when tasks are repeated, she adjusts her behavior. In
1Reviews of WTA/WTP studies can be found in Horowitz and McConnell (2002), Brown and Gregory (1999),
Sayman and Onculer (2005), and Plott and Zeiler (2005).
2The WTA/WTP gap has been found in studies that use incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms and control
for income and substitution effects (e.g. Bateman et al., 1997).
3A related argument has been proposed by Ert and Erev (2008) to explain why gambles with positive expected
value but a chance of a loss are rejected more often in some settings than others
4A heuristic is a rule-of-thumb or simplifying procedure that typically gives accurate judgments and optimal be-
havior but can also give rise to systematic errors. See Kahneman et al. (1981) or Gilovich et al. (2002) for a summary
of the literature on heuristics.
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Table 1: The WTA/WTP Gap and the Effects of Laboratory Market Experience
Study Good(s) Trials Main Finding
Coursey et al. 1987 tasting a bitter liquid 5-10 Gap reduces
Kahneman et al. 1990 induced value tokens 1-3 No gap
pens, mugs, binoculars 4-5 Gap persists
Shogren et al. 1994 chocolate and coffee mugs 5 Gap closes
food safety 20 Gap persists
List and Shogren 1999 chocolate bars 4 Gap closes
food safety 9-10 Gap reduces
Shogren et al. 2001 chocolate and mugs (2nd Price Auction) 10 Gap closes
chocolate and mugs (Random Price Auction) 10 Gap closes
Knetsch et al. 2001 coffee mugs (2nd Price Auction) 6 Gap closes
coffee mugs (9th Price Auction) 6 Gap widens
Loomes et al. 2003 2 unresolved risky lotteries 6 Gap closes
contrast, a subject who is one of the most intense traders in a naturally occurring market not only
has more experience of trading but also a different type of experience: trading under asymmetric
information as the informed party. Consequently, he has not adopted the heuristic of setting WTA
above WTP, so does not do so in valuation tasks. There are several mechanism that could account
for how heuristics are chosen. A plausible candidate is some variant of Thorndike‘s (1898) law
of effect (actions that have led to satisfying consequences are repeated more frequently; those that
have led to unsatisfying consequences, less frequently).5 Although there is relatively little research
on simple learning models in the economics literature, there is evidence that in some settings such
models predict behavior better than standard game theory (Erev and Roth, 1998).
The caution heuristic conjecture was tested in a repeated market experiment with over 200 sub-
jects. The experiment had two parts each of which consisted of 10 rounds where subjects bought
or sold lotteries in a Vickrey auction under either symmetric or asymmetric information. The re-
sults provide some support for the caution heuristic conjecture. Under symmetric information, the
WTA/WTP gap decayed; under asymmetric information it persisted. Individual bidding patterns
suggested previous trading success increases willingness to trade. When subjects switch between
facing symmetric information and asymmetric information as the uninformed party, they do not
5Another possible explanation is evolution. Heifetz and Segev (2004) argue the WTA/WTP gap is an example of
toughness and that a toughness bias may be evolutionary viable. They show how in an evolutionary model toughness
can emerge in bargaining with asymmetric information. Further more, Chen et al. (2006) ran experiments using
capuchin monkeys and find evidence of loss aversion, which suggests it may have an evolutionary origin. It is not
clear, however, how an evolutionary account could explain why the gap is eliminated by certain experiences.
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immediately adjust their behavior. Finally, when the market regime switches from asymmetric
information to symmetric information, the previously informed traders trade more frequently than
the previously uninformed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes how setting WTA above WTP
can be optimal when bidding in a Vickrey Auction and faced with asymmetric information. Section
2 presents the experimental design, the hypotheses tested, and the details of how the experiment
was implemented. Section 3 analyzes the experimental results. Finally, Section 4 discusses the
results and their implications.
1 Optimal Behavior in a Vickrey Auction with Asymmetric In-
formation
This section presents a concrete example of how asymmetric information could explain a gap be-
tween WTA and WTP under standard theory. It is intended to capture the key features of trading
under asymmetric information in a way that can be implemented in an experiment. Suppose that
there is an item that is worth 30 in one state of the world (the low state) and 70 in another (the high
state). Three people are bidding to buy the item in a second price sealed-bid buying auction (the
highest bidder receives the item and pays the second highest bid). All three are risk neutral ex-
pected utility maximizers. The two states of the world are known to obtain with equal probability.
For all three bidders, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid 50, the expected value of the item 6.
Now suppose that one of the bidders (call him the informed) observes which state of the world
obtains before placing his bid. It is a weakly dominant strategy for the informed to bid 30 in
the low state and 70 in the high state. The other two bidders (call them the uninformed) know the
informed will observe the state of the world before bidding but cannot observe it themselves. There
are no weakly dominant strategies for the uninformed.7 However, how they bid can be predicted
using iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies.8 For the informed, bidding 30 in the low
state and 70 in the high state weakly dominates all other strategies, so all other strategies can be
6Consider an auction for a lottery with expected value 50 from the point of view of bidder 1, who submits bid b.
Suppose the highest competing bid is p. Since bidder 1 is risk neutral, the value of the lottery to them is 50. Bidder
1’s payoff is 50− p if b > p and zero otherwise. By bidding 50, bidder 1 will win if p < 50 and not if p > 50.
Suppose bidder 1 bids b< 50. When b> p, then they still win and their profit is 50− p. If p> 50 > b, they still lose.
However, if 50 > p> b, they lose but would have made a positive profit had they bid 50. Thus, bidding b< 50 never
increases profits and in some cases decreases it. A corresponding argument applies to bidding b> 50. A more detailed
discussion of bidding behavior in second price auctions can be found in Krishna (2002, p15)
7If the informed player bids 40 in both states and the other uninformed player bids 41, the best response for the
remaining uninformed player is to bid > 41 whereas if the informed bids 30 in the low state and 70 in the high state
and the first uninformed player bids 41, the second uninformed player’s best response is to bid < 41.
8See Marx (1999) for a discussion of iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
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removed. In the resulting game, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the uninformed to bid 30.
Conversely, in a second price sealed-bid selling auction, after the informed’s weakly domi-
nated strategies are deleted, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the uninformed to bid 70. So the
uninformed have a reason to bid lower in buying auctions than they do in selling auctions.
2 The Experiment
2.1 Design and Predictions
Subjects faced a variant of the decision problem described above in Section 1. Each subject was
assigned to a trading group. Members of a trading group bid against each other in a series of 20
auction rounds. Each round consisted of an auction to buy or sell lotteries after which the lotteries
were played out and subjects told how much they had made or lost in the round. The markets were
one sided in the sense that all the subjects were buying (selling) lotteries from (to) the experimenter.
This is an important feature of the design since it prevents the market unravelling under asymmetric
information in the way Akerlof (1970) described. Market prices were generated using a median
price Vickrey auction as used by Loomes et al. (2003). An advantage of this auction is that for a
given set of bids, the price produced by a median price buying auction will be the same as the one
produced by a median price selling auction. This allows meaningful comparisons between buying
and selling prices.
The auctions occurred under two market regimes: symmetric information and asymmetric in-
formation. Under symmetric information, everyone had the same information when they were
placing their bids. Under asymmetric information, a minority of the members of each trading
group were given extra information about which lottery outcome would occur before they placed
their bids. Suppose all the informed bid bI and all uninformed bid bU and bI 6= bU . Since the
median bid is the price and the majority of bids are placed by the uninformed, the price will be bU .
If the price were determined by the informed, then the price under asymmetric information would
be no different to what it would be if everyone were informed.
Each trading group and hence each subject was assigned to one of eight treatments. The or-
ganization of the treatments is shown in Table 2. The experiment was divided into two parts each
consisting of ten rounds. Some treatments switched between symmetric and asymmetric informa-
tion after ten rounds while others did not. In the rest of this paper, the abbreviations SS, SA, AS,
and AA shown in the first column of the table are used to refer to the treatments.
The caution heuristic conjecture predicts that subjects who are used to trading under asym-
metric information as the uninformed party will initially set WTA above WTP. When the market is
repeated, they will adjust their behavior if the heuristic they are using produces bad outcomes. This
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Table 2: The Treatments
Treatment Regime Type Subjects Trading
Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 Groups
SS Symmetric Symmetric Buying 22 4
Selling 29 5
SA Symmetric Asymmetric Buying 22 4
Selling 31 5
AS Asymmetric Symmetric Buying 27 5
Selling 31 5
AA Asymmetric Asymmetric Buying 24 4
Selling 22 4
Each row on the table represents a treatment. Each trading group consisted of 5 or 7 sub-
jects.
means that under symmetric information the WTA/WTP gap would decay whereas under asym-
metric information it would persist or widen. This can be tested by comparing the size of the gap in
round 1 and round 10. The conjecture also suggests that good and bad outcomes will influence sub-
sequent behavior. This can be investigated by testing whether previous trading success increases
willingness to trade. Another aspect of the conjecture is that people do not deliberately solve
decision problems. This can be investigated by comparing behavior before and after the regime
switches between symmetric and asymmetric information. Finally, under asymmetric informa-
tion, the informed and uninformed will have different experiences. The effect of these experiences
can be investigated using the results of rounds 11 to 20 of the AS treatments and comparing the
willingness to trade of the previously informed and uninformed.
2.2 Procedure
Subjects were divided into trading groups of 5 or 7 and traded in buying or selling auctions for
lotteries. In the buying treatments, subjects were endowed with credits9 and took part in auctions
to buy lotteries from the experimenter. Subjects completed the sentence ‘I am willing to buy the
lottery from the experimenter if the price is less than __ credits’ by typing a value. When all
subjects had entered bids, the computer selected the median bid as the market price, p. Everyone
who bid above p paid p and received the lottery; everyone who bid p or less did not trade. In the
selling treatments they were endowed with lotteries and took part in auctions to sell lotteries to
the experimenter. Subjects completed, ‘I am willing to sell the lottery to the experimenter if the
price is more than __ credits’. The median ask was selected as the price p. Everyone who asked
less than p received p credits and gave up the lottery; everyone who asked p or more did not trade.
9The credits were exchanged for cash at the end of the experiment.
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Figure 1: The Spinning Arrow
(a) Unresolved Lottery (b) Resolved Lottery
(c) High State (d) Low State
The lotteries used are shown in Table 3. The lotteries labeled high state and low state have two
possible outcomes. For instance, the low state lottery pays out zero with probability 0.63 and 31
with probability 0.37. The composite lottery (shown on the last row of the table) is constructed by
combining the low state and high state lotteries. 10
In rounds with symmetric information, the composite lottery was traded. In rounds with asym-
metric information, the minority were informed i.e. 2 in trading groups of 5, 3 in trading groups
of 7. The informed traders were told whether it was a high or low state before bidding; the un-
informed traders were not. So effectively, the informed were trading either the high or low state
lotteries while the uninformed were trading the composite lottery. The uninformed were told that
there were informed subjects in the trading group and told what the informed would have been
told.
Figure 1 shows how the lotteries were presented to the subjects when they were prompted to
place bids. Figure 1a, was shown to everyone in symmetric information auctions and to the unin-
formed in asymmetric information auctions. Figure 1c, was shown to the informed in asymmetric
information auctions when the high state occurred; Figure 1d, was shown to them, when the low
state occurred. The lottery outcomes were determined by computer generated random numbers.
There was one lottery outcome per trading group per round. The outcomes were revealed to sub-
jects after the outcome of each auction. An animated spinning arrow, Figure 1b, was used to present
the lottery outcomes. Examples of the complete screens subjects saw are shown in appendices B.1
to B.5.
10We can think of the composite lottery as a lottery with two outcomes which are themselves lotteries. With
probability 0.43 the outcome of the composite lottery is the low state lottery; with probability 1−0.43 = 0.57 it is the
high state lottery. The low state lottery pays out 31 with probability 0.37, so the composite lottery will pay out 31 with
probability 0.37×0.43≈ 0.16. The probability values for the other payouts are calculated in the same way.
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Table 3: The Lotteries Used
Name Lotterya Expected
Value
Low state l (0,0.63;31,0.37) 11.5
High state h (63,0.40;97,0.69) 83.3
Composite (l,0.43;h,0.57) (0,0.27;31,0.16;63,0.23;97,0.34) 47.8
a Each lottery is a list of consequences (x1, . . . , xn) and the associated probability of the consequence
occurring (p1, . . . , pn) written in the form (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) where n is the number of possible out-
comes of the lottery. For instance, the lottery low state pays out zero with probability 0.63 and pays
out 31 with probability 0.37. Probability figures are rounded to two decimal places.
A paper copy of the instructions was given to the subjects (see appendix A). Before the exper-
iment started the experimenter read the instructions aloud, then gave subjects the opportunity to
ask questions. All subjects were told about symmetric and asymmetric information even if they
did not participate in auctions under both regimes. The motivation for this was to isolate the effect
of knowing about asymmetric information from actually experiencing it.11
3 Results
A total of 208 people participated in the experiment. They were divided into 36 trading groups.
Table 2 shows how the subjects and trading groups were divided among the 8 treatments. Two
types of data were collected: prices and valuations.
In each auction the median bid or ask determined the price at which lotteries were bought or
sold. There was one auction per trading group per round giving a total of 36× 20 = 720 obser-
vations across all treatments. Prices have an obvious economic meaning. If the price changes,
then so do the payoffs of the subjects who traded. In contrast, if one of the bids changes without
influencing the price, then the payoffs of the subjects who traded are unchanged. The subject who
submits the bid that determines the price is at the margin between trading and not trading, hence
there is a greater incentive for them than for non marginal bidders to bid carefully. The evolution
of prices in each of the treatments is shown in Figure 2. The graphs show the mean price across
trading groups in each treatment.
In each auction, every subject submitted a bid or ask. Every subject completed 20 auctions
giving a total of 208× 20 = 4160 observations. The advantage of studying bids and asks is that
all the data is used and questions about individual behavior can be addressed. The evolution of
11This approach is similar to the one used by Andreoni and Miller (1993) in their experiment where in some
treatments there was a 50% chance of meeting a computer opponent and in others a 0.1% chance. In both treatments
subjects knew about the chance of meeting a computer, but only in one was there a realistic chance of this happening.
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Figure 2: The Evolution of Prices by Treatment
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bids and asks in each of the treatments made by uninformed subjects is shown in Figure 3 and the
evolution of those made by informed subjects is shown in Figure 4.12
3.1 Round 1 and Round 10 Behavior
Result 1 The size of the WTA/WTP gap decreases in a repeated market with symmetric informa-
tion.
Support. The mean buying and selling price in round one and round ten under symmetric infor-
mation are shown in the upper section of Table 4. The columns labeled gap report the difference
between mean selling and buying prices. Observations from the SS and SA treatments are pooled.
Rounds 1-10 of these treatments had symmetric information. In a given treatment, subjects were
either buying for the whole experiment or selling for the whole experiment. Each subject only took
part in one treatment. As a consequence, the buying and selling figures are produced by different
sets of subjects but corresponding first and last round figures are produced by the same set of sub-
jects. In the first round there is a statistically significant gap. In the final rounds the gap is smaller
and not statistically significant, but still present. The round 1 ratio of selling to buying price is
55.0
47.9 = 1.15. The expected value of the lottery is 47.8. Buying prices are close to expected value
whereas selling prices are a few points above it. There is little if any evidence of risk aversion.
The lower section of Table 4 shows similar data for individual bids rather than market prices.
The same pattern emerges: a statistically significant gap partially closes.
Result 2 The WTA/WTP gap persists in a repeated market with asymmetric information.
Support. The mean round 1 and round 10 prices under asymmetric information are shown in the
upper section of Table 4. Data from the AA and AS treatments are pooled. The figures in the gap
columns are the difference between the mean selling and buying prices. First round behavior is
similar to that under symmetric information: there is a statistically significant gap in the predicted
direction. However the gap persists and marginally increases in size. Note, that iterated deletion of
weakly dominated strategies suggests that the buying price should fall to 11.5 (the expected value
of the lottery in the low state) and the selling price should rise to 83.3 (the expected value of the
lottery in the high state). Instead, although the gap persists, buying and selling prices remained
relatively close to the expected value of the lottery across both states which is 47.8.
Mean bids under asymmetric information are shown in the lower section of Table 4. Under
asymmetric information, the uninformed did not know whether it was a high or low payout state
12A subject is classed as ‘informed’ if for at least one part of the experiment they were an informed trader. A subject
is classed as ‘uninformed’ if they were never an informed trader.
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Figure 3: The Evolution of Bids by Treatment: Uninformed Subjects
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Figure 4: The Evolution of Bids by Treatment: Informed Subjects
0
20
40
60
80
0
20
40
60
80
0
20
40
60
80
1 10 11 20
AA
AS
SA
asymmetric high state, selling
asymmetric high state, buying
symmetric, selling
symmetric, buying
asymmetric low state, selling
asymmetric low state, buying
M
ea
n
 B
id
s 
an
d
 A
sk
s
Round
12
Table 4: Mean Prices and Bids
Round 1 Round 10
buying selling gap buying selling gap
Prices Symmetric Information
47.9 55.0 7.1∗∗∗ 49.8 53.6 3.9
(5.8) (5.8) (4.0) (2.3)
Prices Asymmetric Information
43.7 53.0 9.3∗ 34.8 58.7 23.9∗∗∗
(14.0) (8.3) (13.9) (16.8)
Bids Symmetric Information
48.4 54.2 5.8∗∗ 50.7 53.2 2.5
(16.6) (13.3) (14.8) (13.0)
Bids Asymmetric Information
Uninformed 39.1 57.2 18.1∗∗∗ 46.3 58.3 12.0∗∗
(16.5) (15.5) (24.0) (18.7)
Informed high state 71.7 64.0 −7.7 60.5 78.2 17.7∗∗∗
(20.4) (20.8) (7.2) (12.1)
Informed high state 26.5 28.7 2.2 14.9 14.5 −0.4
(20.0) (15.0) (13.7) (14.6)
Data from (a) the SS and SA treatments and (b) the AS and AA treatments are pooled. Samples standard deviations
are in parentheses. The null hypothesis gap≤ 0 is tested against the alternative gap> 0 using a t-test.
The low state is when the lottery paid out 0 or 31; the high state when it paid out 63 or 97. The informed traders
were told whether it was a high or low state before they bid; the uninformed were not.
Significance levels: * denotes 10 percent; ** denotes 5 percent; *** denotes 1 percent.
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when placing their bids but the informed did know. The bids are disaggregated accordingly into
those made by the uninformed, the informed when they knew it was a high state, and the informed
when they knew it was a low state. For the uninformed, there is a gap between buying and selling
bids in round 1 and round 10. The informed take advantage of the extra information they possess
and bid considerably higher when they know it is a high state.
3.2 Trading Success
The last section found that the WTA/WTP gap closes under symmetric information but persists
under asymmetric information. What causes the changes over successive rounds, and why does
behavior differ between symmetric and asymmetric information? This section assesses whether
previous successful trades influence behavior in later rounds.
Result 3 Willingness to trade increases with previous trading success.
Support. I estimate the following model13:
bidit = αi+β successi,t−1 + γDit +ψt + εit (1)
The variables are defined as follows: bidit is the bid or ask submitted by subject i in round t
of the experiment. Fixed effects are captured by αi and ψt : αi represents characteristics of subject
i that influence bids but whose effects are constant across rounds; ψt represents factors that vary
across successive auction rounds but are constant across subjects. The variable successi,t−1 is a
measure of the relative number of profitable and loss-making trades subject i made before round
t; β is the corresponding coefficient. Dit is a vector of dummy variables specifying the decision
problem subject i faced in round t; γ is a vector of corresponding coefficients. The final term, εit
captures errors, the variation in bidit not accounted for by the preceding variables.
Trading success is measured as follows. When buying the lottery trading is profitable if and
only if the lottery payout exceeds the price. When selling the lottery trading is profitable if and
only if the lottery payout falls short of the price. Let piit indicate the outcome of subject i’s trading
in round t as follows:
piit =

+1 i f traded and pro f ited
0 i f did not tradeor traded and exactlybrokeeven
−1 i f traded andmadealoss
(2)
13The equation is a two-way fixed effects model. It has a similar form to the one used by List and Shogren (1999)
to determine whether previous observed market prices influence bidding in repeated second price auctions.
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Table 5: Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimates of the Relation between Amount Bid and Previous
Trading Success
Pooled SS SA AS AA
buying selling buying selling buying selling buying selling buying selling
success 4.7∗∗∗ −7.1∗∗∗ 4.3∗ −3.9∗ 5.1 −5.1∗ 0.8 −6.8∗∗ 7.4∗∗−14.7∗∗∗
(1.9) (1.7) (3.0) (2.7) (4.8) (3.3) (3.7) (4.0) (3.7) (4.0)
p(β |H0) 0.006 0.000 0.079 0.070 0.145 0.059 0.415 0.046 0.022 0.000
N 1805 2147 418 551 418 589 513 589 456 418
The table shows the results of estimating equation 1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. β is the coefficient on the
measure of trading success. p(β |H0) is the p value for the obtained results under the null hypothesis that (i) β ≤ 0 for buying
and (ii) β ≥ 0 for selling. N is the number of observations where each bid counts as one observation. Significance levels: *
denotes 10 percent; ** denotes 5 percent; *** denotes 1 percent.
Subject i’s relative success trading in all rounds up to and including t is measured as follows.
successi,t =
t
∑
k=1
piik
t
(3)
The measure has the following properties. If the majority of trades have been profitable, then
success> 0. If the majority of trades have been loss making, then success< 0. If subject i does not
trade in round t, then |successi,t | < |successi,t−1|, that is the magnitude of success decreases. The
motivation for this measure is that people might use a variant of the availability heuristic to judge
how likely it is they will make a profit from trading. The more often they have traded and made a
profit in previous auctions, the easier it will be for them to imagine that trading in the next auction
will be profitable, hence they will judge that trading is more likely to be profitable and accordingly
they will be more willing to trade.14
Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation 1 for (a) a pool of the 4 buying treatments,
(b) a pool of the 4 selling treatments, and (c) each of the 8 treatments. Whichever set of bids the
estimation is estimated on, increased trading success (i) increases bids in buying treatments but (ii)
decreases bids in selling treatments. Bidding higher in a buying auction increases the likelihood of
trading; bidding lower in a selling auction does the same. Hence the results suggest willingness to
trade increases with previous trading success.
14Kahneman and Tversky (1973) give the following example of the availability heuristic: “one may assess the
divorce rate in a given community by recalling divorces among ones acquaintances. If subjects in the experiment use
a similar heuristic, they may assess the probability that the next trade will be profitable by recalling what happened in
previous trades.
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3.3 Spillovers between Markets with Symmetric and Asymmetric Informa-
tion
Does the presence of informed subjects and the resulting asymmetric information cause the un-
informed to behave differently? If so, when the market regime changes between symmetric and
asymmetric information, do those without the informational advantage adapt their behavior imme-
diately or is the change gradual?
Result 4 The uninformed do not immediately change their behavior when they switch between
facing symmetric and asymmetric information.
Support. I estimate the following two models:
bidit = αi+β0AIi,t +ψt + εit (4)
bidit = αi+β0AIi,t +β1AIi,t−1 + . . .+β4AIi,t−4 +ψt + εit (5)
where bidit is the bid or ask submitted by subject i in round t. As in equation 1, αi and ψt cap-
ture fixed effects of individuals and experiment round number. AIi,t is a dummy variable: AIi,t = 1
if subject i faced asymmetric information in round t of the experiment; AIi,t = 0 if they faced
symmetric information. The equations were estimated for buying and selling auctions separately.
Equation 4 is estimated using all bids from the SS treatments plus all the bids made by the un-
informed from the AS, SA and AA treatments (i.e. bids made by the informed are excluded).
Equation 5 is estimated using a subset of the bids used to estimate equation 4: the bids that are not
used are those where t < 5 since the dummy variable AIi,t−4 does not exist for these bids.
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equations 4 and 5. The estimates of the coefficients for
the dummy variables show how bids are adjusted relative to bids placed under symmetric infor-
mation. For instance, the estimates of equation 4 suggest when the uninformed face asymmetric
information, they bid 12 points lower in buying auctions and 2.3 points higher in selling auctions.
If the uninformed adjusted their behavior immediately when they faced asymmetric information,
we would expect (a) the AIt coefficients to be equal in the simple model and the model with lags
and (b) the coefficients on the lagged dummy variables to be zero. Instead, the coefficients on
the lagged dummy variables are not zero. This indicates that the value of a bid is influenced by
whether there was asymmetric information in previous rounds. Hence, it appears the uninformed
do not adjust their bidding strategy immediately when the regime switches between symmetric and
asymmetric information.
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Table 6: Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimates of the Relationship between
Value Bid and Asymmetric Information
Buying Selling
Simple Spillovers Simple Spillovers
Equation Estimated 4 5 4 5
AIt −12.0∗∗∗ 1.3 2.3∗∗ 1.1
(1.3) (3.1) (1.0) (2.4)
AIt−1 −9.5∗∗ −0.4
(4.1) (3.2)
AIt−2 −4.8 2.6
(4.1) (3.2)
AIt−3 0.6 −0.6
(4.1) (3.2)
AIt−4 −2.2 0.1
(3.1) (2.4)
Subjects N 65 65 78 78
Rounds T 20 16 20 16
Observations T ×N 1300 1040 1560 1248
The table shows the results of estimating equations 4 and 5. The dependent variable is
bidit , the bid made by subject i in round t. The equations were estimated using all bids
from the SS treatments and the bids of the uninformed in the other treatments. The re-
ported figures are coefficients for dummy variables indicating whether round t−x had
asymmetric information. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: ** denotes 5 percent; *** denotes 1 percent.
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Table 7: The Effects of Experience of Asymmetric Infor-
mation on Behavior under Symmetric Information
Experience Bid Trading Rate Plays Lottery Rate
Uninformed
buying 47.6 0.33 0.33
selling 52.0 0.39 0.61
all 49.9 0.36 0.47
Informed
buying 53.3 0.46 0.46
selling 50.9 0.38 0.62
all 52.0 0.42 0.55
The table reports data from rounds 11 to 20 of the AS treatment (the
rounds with symmetric information).
We can also analyze how the informed and uninformed behave after the regime switches from
asymmetric to symmetric information.
Result 5 After the market regime switches from asymmetric to symmetric information, the previ-
ously informed traders have a higher propensity to trade than the previously uninformed.
Support. Table 7 reports behavior at the level of the individual for rounds 11 to 20 of the AS
treatment (i.e. the behavior under symmetric information of those with experience of asymmetric
information). The behavior of the subjects who were previously uninformed traders is compared to
the behavior of those who were previously informed (rounds 1-10 of treatment AS had asymmetric
information). The Bid column shows the mean bids. The Trading Rate is the proportion who either
buy or sell the lottery. The Plays Lottery Rate is the proportion of subjects who hold a lottery at
the end of the round (i.e. those who buy the lottery or do not sell it). The uninformed trade at
lower rates than the informed and are less likely to finish the round holding a lottery. This can
be interpreted as experience of being the uninformed party under asymmetric information having
two effects: first, it increases aversion to trading (the endowment effect); second, it increases risk
aversion. In buying auctions, these two factors act in the same direction; in selling auctions, they
act in opposite directions. So there is a large difference between the behavior of the informed and
uninformed in buying auctions.
To test hypotheses about the relative trading rates of the informed and uninformed it does not
make sense to look at individual level data since whether a given subject trades in an auction is
not independent of whether the others trade. For example, in a trading group of 5 (and assuming
no ties) exactly two members trade; in a group of 7, three trade. To get around this difficulty, each
auction is taken as one observation and the following is asked: is the number of trades by informed
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Table 8: The Trading Rate of Previously Informed Traders under Symmetric
Information
Selling Buying Total
Number of auctions previously informed traders:
trade not more than expected 24 14 37
trade more than expected 26 36 62
Total 40 50 100
The table reports the trading rates during rounds 11-20 of the AS treatment of those who were
informed traders during rounds 1-10. There were 10 trading groups in the AS treatment and
each trading group completed 10 rounds under symmetric information giving 100 auctions. In
each of the remaining auctions, the expected number of trades by previously informed traders
is calculated as expected trades= total trades× in f ormed tradersall traders .
traders more or less than expected? The expected number of trades by previously informed traders
is calculated as expected trades = total trades× in f ormed tradersall traders . Table 8 reports the number of
auctions in which the informed traders traded more and less than expected. If there were no
difference in the behavior of the previously informed and uninformed, then the informed should
trade more than expected and less than expected with equal probability. In fact the informed traders
traded more than expected in 62100 of the auctions.
Consider (i) the null hypothesis that in each auction informed traders are equally likely to trade
more than expected as they are less than expected and (ii) the alternative hypothesis that informed
traders trade more than expected. To test the hypotheses, I estimate the following fixed effects logit
model:
Pr(in f ormed tradesit > total tradesit× in f ormed tradersiall tradersi ) = Λ(β + γi+uit) (6)
where in f ormed tradesit is the number of trades by previously informed traders in trading
group i and round t, in f ormed tradersi is the number of informed traders in trading group i etc.
The coefficient β is positive if informed traders on average trade more than expected. The coef-
ficient γ i captures trading group fixed effects. It is positive if informed traders in trading group i
trade more than expected more often than informed traders in the other trading groups. Finally,
uit is the residual. Since the model controls for trading group fixed effects, it allows meaningful
hypothesis testing even though there is more than one observation per trading group. The null
hypothesis β = 0 was tested against the alternative β > 0. The test produced a p-value of 0.02 for
obtaining the observed results under the null hypothesis.
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4 Discussion
The experiment was motivated by the conjecture that willingness to trade is determined by a heuris-
tic rather than deliberate analysis of decision problems. The results are consistent with previous
studies in that I find that under symmetric information (a) there is an initial gap between WTA
and WTP for lotteries and (b) that this gap decays in a repeated market. The novel findings are
as follows. First, under asymmetric information the WTA/WTP gap persists in a repeated mar-
ket. Second, willingness to trade increases with previous trading success. Third, when the market
regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately ad-
just their behavior. Fourth, when the regime switches from asymmetric information to symmetric
information, the previously informed traders trade more than the previously uninformed. These
results support the caution heuristic conjecture.
One might wonder why, if using a heuristic causes suboptimal behavior as described above,
people would solve decision problems using a heuristic rather than deliberately solving each one.
A possible explanation is that determining the optimal behavior under asymmetric information
is hard. People do not fully take into account how other people’s actions depend on these other
people’s information (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). For instance consider the asymmetric information
problem subjects faced in the experiment. Iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies sug-
gests an equilibrium where the selling price is 83.3 and the buying price 11.5. Even when the same
problem is repeated 10 times, the market prices were no where near these values. If people can not
solve a relatively simple asymmetric information problem in the lab, even when it is repeated, can
we expect them to do better in naturally occurring markets where the problems are likely less well
specified and successive problems are unlikely to be identical?
One might also wonder if the observed behavior, such as willingness to trade increasing with
previous trading success, would occur if the stakes were higher or the time period were longer.
While it is hard to answer these questions decisively, there is evidence that even over longer pe-
riods and when the stakes are high, personal experience influences behavior. For instance, Mal-
mendier and Nagel (forthcoming) find that people who have experienced low stock-market returns
throughout their lives so far are less willing to take financial risk, are less likely to participate in
the stock market and invest a lower fraction of their liquid assets in stocks if they participate.
This paper builds on earlier studies on how market experience affects willingness to trade. In
a recent study, Engelmann and Hollard (2010) found that the reluctance to trade typically found
in simple exchange experiments (e.g. Knetsch (1989)) could be eliminated if subjects had first
taken part in a “forced trade” round. In this “forced trade” round, subjects were endowed with
one of two items and could trade with other subjects in a group. At the end of the round, if a
subject possessed an item of the type with which they had been endowed, they had to return it to
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the experimenter; otherwise (if they had traded), they kept the item they possessed. Engelmann
and Hollard conjecture that “forcing” subjects to make trades they would not otherwise have made
teaches them that trading is not as risky as they had feared, so they are more willing to trade in
subsequent tasks. In terms of the caution heuristic conjecture presented in this paper, the results
can be interpreted as follows. The “forced trade” treatment has the opposite effect to asymmetric
information. Under forced trade, not trading results in losses, so subjects adopt the heuristic of
being willing to trade; under asymmetric information, trading results in losses, so subjects adopt
the heuristic of being reluctant to trade.
What are the wider consequences of people using a caution heuristic? The direct consequence
is that the decision of whether or not to trade is not fully determined by preferences. There will be
some potential trades that will make both parties better off but will not be executed. This means
that welfare gains from trade will not be fully realized. Furthermore, there are consequences to
spillover effects. Suppose making a loss on a trade causes a person to be more cautious and
generally more reluctant to trade. Institutions that protect buyers from making losses on purchases
will reduce the number of buyers suffering losses and so cautiousness among buyers. Examples
of such institutions include legal rights for buyers of goods, additional guarantees offered by some
sellers, financial redress for people who were miss-sold financial products. Notice, however, if
both buyers and sellers are equally prone to use a caution heuristic, institutions that transfer risk
between them will not increase the gains from trade if transferring the risk makes one party less
cautious but the other more cautious.
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A Instructions
 1 
Introduction 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment investigating how people make decisions in 
markets.  During the session, please do not talk or communicate with any of the other 
participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk 
to answer it. 
 
Payment 
 
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.  The amount you receive will 
depend on the decisions you and other participants make and the outcome of random 
events.  During the course of the experiment you will gain or lose credits.  At the end of 
the experiment, the credits you have accumulated will be exchanged for real money.  You 
will receive £1 for every 250 credits. 
 
Outline 
 
The experiment involves buying lotteries.  The experiment is divided into two parts: A 
and B.  There are 10 rounds in each part, so there are 20 rounds in total.  In each round 
you will be allocated 100 credits and have the chance to buy a lottery from the 
experimenter.  The price of the lottery will be determined by a special type of auction 
(how the auction works is described in detail later).  At the end of each round you will be 
told the result of the auction and how much the lottery paid out.  How much you earn 
from each round is affected by some or all of the following factors: whether you buy the 
lottery, the price of the lottery, and how much the lottery pays out.  If you do not buy the 
lottery, the amount you earn from the round is simply the 100 credits you were allocated 
at the start of the round.  If you buy the lottery, your earnings are 100 credits plus 
whatever the lottery pays out minus the amount you paid for the lottery.  
 
After each round your earnings from the round are banked.  At the end of the experiment 
you will be paid based on the number of credits you have banked over the 20 rounds. 
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Lotteries 
 
The lotteries will be shown to you in the following format. 
 
 
The lottery shown above pays out 0 credits with probability 27%, 31 credits with 
probability 16%, 63 credits with probability 23%, and 97 credits with probability 34%. 
 
The lottery result is determined by a computer simulated spinning device as illustrated 
below.  The amount that the lottery pays out depends on what colour the arrow is pointing 
to after it has been spun.  In the screenshot below, the arrow is pointing to region D, so 
the lottery would payout 97 credits.  There are no tricks.  The probability figures for each 
of the regions are accurate.  We have determined all of the lottery outcomes in advance, 
so we do not have to do this during the experiment.  However, we can assure you that the 
outcomes of the lotteries were resolved in a genuinely random way.  If you wish, after the 
experiment is over you can request a printout showing all the lottery outcomes for the 
session you took part in to verify this. The outcomes are then revealed to the participants 
in the experiment at the appropriate stage in the experiment 
 
 
 
Auctions 
 
As stated above, during the experiment you will participate in a series of auctions to buy 
lotteries.  You will be told how many other participants are bidding in the auctions.  It 
will be the same people bidding against you in every auction. 
 
During the auction, you and the other participants are bidding to buy a lottery from the 
experimenter.  Each participant can only buy one lottery per auction.  However, in most 
auctions more than one participant will buy a lottery.  The price and who buys will be 
determined as follows. 
25
 3 
 
(1) How are bids entered?  Each participant will be prompted to type a bid into the box 
shown on the screenshot below. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
(2) How is the price determined?  The computer will record the bids made by each of 
the participants and arrange them in order from lowest to highest.  Suppose, for example, 
the bids were: 
35, 36, 56, 68, 72 
 
The middle value (median) determines the price.  So in this case the price would be 56. 
 
(3) Who buys the lotteries and how much do they pay? 
Each of the participants who bid above the price buys a lottery.  They pay the price, not 
the amount they bid.  So, if (as in the above example) the bids were 35, 36, 56, 68 and 72, 
the price would be 56 and the participants who bid 68 and 72 would each pay 56 and play 
the lottery. 
 
(4) Who gets told what?  After the auction, you won’t be told the value of other 
participants’ bids and they won’t be told the value of your bid.  However, you and the 
other participants will be told the price and who bought lotteries. 
 
Informed Traders 
 
As noted above, the experiment will be divided into two parts: A and B.  Each part will 
consist of 10 rounds.  Before the experiment starts you will be assigned to a group of 5 or 
7 participants who you will play against in the auctions.   
 
In some groups 2 or 3 participants will be selected to be Informed Traders in one or both 
parts of the experiment.  Whether you are assigned to a group with Informed Traders and 
if so, whether you are selected to be an informed trader is determined at random.  
Everyone in the group will be told whether the group contains Informed Traders.  If the 
group does contain Informed Traders, everyone in the group will be told how many 
Informed Traders there are in the group and whether or not they are an informed trader. 
  
The Informed Traders will be given extra information about where the spinner that 
determines the lottery outcome stopped before they enter their bid.  The screenshot below 
shows an example of what the informed traders might see. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
 
The other members of the group (The Uninformed) will be told that there are Informed 
Traders in the group, but The Uninformed will not be given any extra information about 
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where the spinner stopped before they make their bids. The screenshot below shows an 
example of what they might see. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
How you will be told the results of the auction and the outcome of the lottery 
 
Once you and the other participants in your group have submitted their bids, you will be 
told the result of the auction and the outcome of the lottery.  The screenshot below shows 
and example of what you might be shown.  (The numbers are just examples and contain 
no significance beyond this.) 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
When you click continue on the ‘Round Results’ screen, you will be shown a summary of 
the results of the experiment so far.  The screenshot below shows an example of what you 
will see. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
It shows that in round 1, you and Player #2 bought a lottery for 48 credits and it paid out 
63 credits, so you both made a profit of 15 from buying the lottery.  Likewise in round 2 
you made a profit of 35 credits from buying the lottery.  In round 3 you did not buy the 
lottery.  Finally, in round 4 you bought the lottery for 40 credits but it paid out zero, so 
you made a loss of 40 credits.  (These numbers are just examples and contain no 
significance beyond this.) 
 
 
When you click continue on the ‘Results so far’ screen you will begin the next round. 
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B Screenshots
B.1 Enter Bid: Symmetric Information
28
B.2 Enter Bid: Asymmetric Information Informed
29
B.3 Enter Bid: Asymmetric Information Uninformed
B.4 Results: Current Round
30
B.5 Results: All Rounds Completed
31
